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Kant on Cognition and Knowledge
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is widely recognized as one of the most 
important and influential works of modern philosophy. At the heart of this 
work lies his theory of cognition (Erkenntnis). While many aspects of this 
theory have received close attention over the past 200 years, it has rarely 
been asked what exactly Kant means by the term “cognition”. It has been 
common, especially among English-speaking Kant scholars, to identify 
cognition with knowledge, an identification that was surely encouraged by 
Kemp Smith’s decision to translate Erkenntnis as knowledge.1 For instance, 
in their groundbreaking books on Kant’s theoretical philosophy Henry Allison 
and Paul Guyer both speak of “knowledge” where Kant talks of “Erkenntnis”, 
while the term “cognition” is hardly ever mentioned and is not listed in either
index.2 Nor is this a peculiarity of the English-speaking literature, as one 
might suspect. For in the German version of his seminal paper on the proof-
structure of the Transcendental Deduction, Dieter Henrich uses “Erkenntnis” 
and “Wissen” interchangeably.3 The list of examples could easily be 
extended. By contrast, we believe that such an identification is at best 
misleading and at worst a serious mistake that can prevent one from 
understanding some of Kant’s most important claims and arguments in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. While the need for some distinction between 
knowledge and cognition in Kant has been emphasized in recent scholarship 
and is reflected in recent translations,4 even those who make this distinction 
typically assume that knowledge is a species of cognition, broadly construed,
and that, on a more narrow construal, cognition coincides with knowledge.5 
By contrast, our main thesis is that Kant’s concepts of cognition and 
knowledge are really disjunct.6 Theoretical cognition, taken in the sense that 
receives special emphasis in the first Critique, is a kind of representation that
is distinct in kind from knowledge proper (taken either in Kant’s sense or in 
the contemporary sense of warranted true belief), yet one that fulfills several
complex and closely related semantic and epistemological functions. For 
cognition, in the basic kind of case, is a mental state through which we are 
aware of the existence and (some of the) general features of objects. As a 
result, cognition, taken in this sense, cannot be equated with knowledge, 
since it is not an assent and does not require justification or warrant. 
Conversely, knowledge requires neither the existence of an object of 
knowledge nor the attribution of general features to it.7 Though cognition 
cannot, for that reason, be identified with knowledge and knowledge is not a 
species of cognition, cognition can still be epistemologically relevant insofar 
as it contributes to the kind of “sufficient objective ground” that, according 
to Kant, is required for knowledge. 8
To show that and how cognition and knowledge are distinct, it is first (I)
necessary to investigate Kant’s explicit characterizations of the nature of 
cognition. As it turns out, he introduces several different notions that must 
be carefully distinguished before identifying the one that is central to his 
project in the first Critique. Then (II), we consider the basic features of Kant’s
conception of knowledge, indicating both how it involves assent and 
objective justification and how it relates to our contemporary conception. 
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Only then (III) will we be in a position to compare and contrast Kant’s 
understanding of cognition and his conception of knowledge in a way that 
allows us to see clearly their fundamental differences and connections. 
Finally (IV), by appreciating the differences between cognition and 
knowledge, we will be able to understand the implications this conception of 
cognition has for some of Kant’s main claims in the Critique of Pure Reason 
as a whole.
I. Kant’s Conceptions of Cognition 
In three separate places Kant provides either a definition of cognition 
or a taxonomy of representations that includes cognition as one of its central
components: (1) a passage from the so-called Jäsche Logik (9:64), (2) the so-
called Stufenleiter passage (A320/370), and (3) several passages at the 
beginning of the Transcendental Logic (A50-51/B74-75; A92/B125; B137; 
B146). Though Kant introduces several somewhat different notions of 
cognition, it turns out that his project in the first Critique emphasizes one 
relatively narrow notion in particular.9
Kant’s most comprehensive and detailed classification involving 
cognition can be found in the so-called Jäsche Logik, where he distinguishes 
seven “degrees of cognition”:
The first degree of cognition is: to represent something;
The second: to represent something with consciousness, or to perceive
(percipere);
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The third: to be acquainted with something (noscere), or to represent 
something in comparison with other things, both as to sameness and 
as to difference.
The fourth: to be acquainted with something with consciousness, i.e., 
to cognize it (cognoscere). Animals are acquainted with objects too, 
but they do not cognize them.
The fifth: to understand something (intelligere), i.e., to cognize 
something through the understanding by means of concepts, or to 
conceive. One can conceive much, although one cannot comprehend 
it, e.g., a perpetuum mobile, whose impossibility is shown in 
mechanics.
The sixth: to cognize something through reason, or to have insight into
it (perspicere). With few things do we get this far, and our cognitions 
become fewer and fewer in number the more that we seek to perfect 
them as to content.
The seventh, finally: to comprehend something (comprehendere), i.e., 
to cognize something through reason or a priori to the degree that is 
sufficient for our purpose (9:64-65).10
This complex passage provides a number of interesting distinctions and 
terminological clarifications. Insofar as there are seven degrees of cognition, 
it is clear that Kant must be operating at the start with an extremely general 
notion of cognition, one that is equivalent, in effect, to that of representation 
(or “representing something”), which he classifies here as the first degree of 
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cognition and regards elsewhere as indefinable (9:33). The second through 
seventh degrees of cognition are then naturally understood as more specific 
kinds of that most generic notion. It does not seem to be the case, however, 
that each degree is necessarily a specification of the previous one, since the 
fifth degree does not obviously presuppose the fourth (though one might 
read it in that way) and the third may not be an instance of the second 
(given what Kant says about the fourth). Also, the fourth degree of cognition 
stands out from the others insofar as it is labeled “to cognize (cognoscere)” 
and thus appears to be not just one species among others, but rather 
cognition in a more proper sense. In any case, what unites these different 
degrees of cognition is that they all are cases of cognition in the broadest 
sense of “representing something”.
In the so-called Stufenleiter passage, which provides a general 
taxonomy of different kinds of representation, Kant introduces a slightly 
different conception of cognition: 
The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Under it 
stands the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception
that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation 
(sensatio); an objective perception is a cognition (cognitio). The latter 
is either an intuition or a concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former 
is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is 
mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things.
A concept is either an empirical or a pure concept, and the pure 
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concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a
pure image of sensibility), is called notio. A concept made up of 
notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience, is an idea or 
a concept of reason (A320/B377).  
According to this passage, a cognition is any conscious representation that is
“objective”, i.e. related to an object either mediately or immediately, and it 
contrasts only with sensations, which are not objective in the appropriate 
sense, and with any representations of which we are not conscious at all.11 
Thus, according to this taxonomy an idea seems to qualify as a cognition, as 
do intuitions and concepts taken on their own.12 Moreover, since we can have
ideas of objects that do not exist, such as “a perfect republic” (9:93), the fact
that cognition in this sense involves a relation to an object cannot require 
successful reference. Instead, it presupposes only that the representation in 
question have a (logically possible) content so that it purports to represent 
some object (in the widest sense). 
If we compare the Stufenleiter passage to the passage from the Jäsche
Logik, several points of overlap and contrast emerge. For example, 
perception is defined in similar terms in both passages. Also, the fourth and 
fifth degrees of cognition seem to be instances of the Stufenleiter’s sense of 
cognition as objective conscious representation, with the fourth involving 
consciousness in (or through) an intuition and the fifth consciousness in (or 
through) a concept. However, the Jäsche Logik mentions some narrower 
notions of cognition that do not feature in the Stufenleiter, such as the sixth 
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and seventh degrees, both of which involve reason (either through insight or 
in the guise of comprehension) and may somehow correspond to, but are not
identical with the “notions” and “ideas” mentioned in the Stufenleiter 
passage.13  
While both the Jäsche Logik and Stufenleiter passages start with very 
broad and generic notions and then distinguish various species within the 
relevant genus, there are other passages in which Kant introduces a much 
more specific conception of cognition, according to which cognition is the 
awareness of the existence of an object and of at least some of its general 
features. For example, prior to the Transcendental Deduction Kant writes: 
“there are two conditions under which alone the cognition of an object is 
possible: first, intuition, through which it is given, but only as appearance; 
second, concept, through which an object is thought that corresponds to 
this intuition” (A92/B125).14 According to this passage, cognition of an object 
requires both an intuition and a corresponding concept (A51/B76f.; cf. 
24:752). That is, cognition in this sense must satisfy two conditions: (i) a 
givenness-condition, according to which an object must be given to the mind
and (ii) a thought-condition, according to which the given object must be 
conceptually determined (cf. A50/B74; A92/B125; B137; B146).15 Although 
Kant never explicitly defines givenness as such, in its most general sense it 
seems to mean that an object is made available to the mind so that one can 
be aware of the existence of the object and (at least some of) its features.16 
Kant claims that in human beings givenness involves passivity insofar as the 
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object must act on our sensibility to be given to us (cf. A19/B33). For a 
possible divine mind, by contrast, its objects would be given to it just by 
being represented (in intellectual intuition).17 Thus it is only for finite beings 
like ourselves that objects are given in sensible intuition, which for Kant 
means that the object is represented not as exhibiting general features, but 
in its particularity. Similarly, only in finite beings does the thought-condition 
require the use of general concepts (which represent an object not in its 
entirety, but only partially, through marks it shares with other objects; cf. 
A68/B93; A320/B377; 9:58), while the contrast between intuition and concept
would fall away for the divine mind (Critique of the Power of Judgment, §§76-
77). 
It is thus in the context of applying this narrower conception of 
cognition to the case of human beings that Kant claims that cognition 
requires the involvement of both sensibility and understanding: “Thoughts 
without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. […] Only 
from their [viz. understanding and senses] unification can cognition arise” 
(A51/B75-6). It is only through sensibility that objects are “given” to us in 
such a way that cognition, unlike an “empty” thought, is able to represent 
and refer to particular objects (rather than fail to refer), and it is only through
the understanding that objects can be “thought”, or “determined” by 
discursive concepts (rather than be “blind”, or indeterminate). As a result, 
cognition in this sense requires the collaboration of both sensibility and 
understanding, intuition and concept. That is, neither intuitions nor concepts 
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on their own qualify as cognition in the narrow sense. Moreover, an idea 
cannot be a cognition in this sense, since the objects of ideas cannot be 
given to the senses (A327/B383) and thus cannot be represented as such in 
human intuition. Even though this narrow sense of cognition is not explicitly 
introduced in either the Jäsche Logik or the Stufenleiter passages, it is what 
Kant in one place calls “cognition in the proper sense” (Erkenntnis in 
eigentlicher Bedeutung) (A78/B103; cf. B149). 
Taking stock so far, we can see that the term “cognition” can have a 
great variety of senses in Kant’s writings, sometimes meaning 
representation in general and other times indicating more or less specific 
kinds of representation, where some require consciousness, a relation to an 
object, reflection, or reason, while others do not. This means that only the 
broader context will allow one to decide which sense of “cognition” is at 
stake in any particular passage. Amidst this plethora of uses, however, Kant 
singles out one specific sense as “cognition in the proper sense”, which is 
highlighted at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic, and is essential to 
his project in the first Critique as a whole. 
This special sense of cognition allows for further refinement along two 
dimensions. The thought-condition requires not only that concepts classify 
objects by means of their general features, but also that the concepts in 
question can be shown to have what Kant calls “objective reality”, or a 
“relation to an object” (A109).18 That is, one must, Kant suggests, be able to 
show that a concept can in fact be applied to an object, because otherwise, it
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might turn out to be an empty concept and thus “a mere form of a thought” 
(B148) such that one could not judge whether its object is possible.19 Indeed, 
one of Kant’s basic concerns about the metaphysical claims of his rationalist 
predecessors is that their concepts might be flights of fancy that do not 
connect up with actual objects in the appropriate way. (Such a failure could 
occur either by these concepts lacking in objective representational content 
and thus failing to refer or by our not being in a position to show that these 
concepts can refer to their objects, even if they do have a content that is 
determinate enough to refer.)20 This aspect of the thought-condition is thus 
particularly pressing for the pure concepts of the understanding, or 
categories, since it is not immediately obvious that such non-empirical 
concepts can be applied to objects.21
The givenness-condition stands in need of further refinement, too, 
since givenness can take different forms in different cases. It seems that for 
Kant the paradigmatic case of givennness is one in which an empirical object
is represented in empirical intuition (or experience), which involves sensation
and thus the “actual presence of the object” (A50/B74). In this sense, only 
objects that actually exist and are immediately present to mind satisfy the 
givenness-condition. Besides this paradigmatic case, though, Kant seems to 
apply the givenness-condition in a more relaxed way, allowing other kinds of 
objects to be given, too, such as mathematical objects (which are given by 
being constructed in pure intuition; cf. A224/B271) and empirical objects, like
magnetic matter, that we cannot in fact perceive (but which could be given 
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in  “possible experience” if our senses were finer, cf. A226/B273). Moreover, 
this more relaxed way of applying the givenness-condition might be relevant 
to how it can be satisfied in cases of universal cognition (e.g. the Principles 
of the Pure Understanding, cf. A762/B790, or empirical generalizations such 
as “all bodies are heavy”, cf. A8/B12), if, in these cases, the condition cannot
be met by all relevant objects being given in an actual intuition. Thus, Kant’s 
notion of “givenness” seems to differ from Russellian “acquaintance” in that 
an object that is not actually present to mind can count as “given” in the 
sense required for cognition in the narrow sense, as long as it actually exists 
(or has existed) and is an object of possible experience (or, in the 
mathematical case, as long as it can be constructed in pure intuition).
One may wonder whether, in addition to the givenness- and thought-
conditions, a third requirement must be placed on cognition in the narrow 
sense, namely truth. However, Kant never seems to draw any explicit 
connection between cognition in the narrow sense and truth. To the contrary,
when he discusses truth in the first Critique, he treats it as a property that 
cognitions may either have or fail to have, explicitly allowing for the 
possibility of false cognition: “a cognition is false if it does not agree with the 
object to which it is related even if it contains something that could well be 
valid of other objects” (A58/B83).22 Since a false cognition, according to this 
passage, still relates to an object and contains a concept that could hold of 
other objects, it would seem that both the givenness- and the thought-
condition are satisfied, so that Kant can be taken to be talking about 
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cognition in the narrow sense here and to allow for it to be false.23 However, 
even if Kant were to hold that cognition in the narrow sense does require 
truth, he could still regard a representation that satisfies both the givenness-
and the thought-condition, while being false, as a cognition in some broader 
sense. Moreover, Kant may be speaking of false cognition only in a derivative
sense (as in “false friend”), as does Meier, whose textbook Kant used in his 
logic lectures and according to whom “false cognition is a cognition that is 
not cognition, but merely seems to be cognition” (Auszug aus der 
Vernunftlehre, §92). Given that Kant neither clearly requires truth for 
cognition in the narrow sense nor clearly denies such a requirement,24 we 
leave open the question of how cognition in the narrow sense relates to 
truth. However, we do not want to deny that cognition must represent the 
object in some minimally accurate way to refer to it at all.
Because cognition in the narrow sense requires satisfaction of the 
givenness- and thought-conditions in the sense just specified, it can be seen 
to have several crucial semantic and epistemic features. First, by satisfying 
the givenness-condition it represents, and refers to, particular objects that 
exist or are actual.25 By contrast, cognition in the broader sense of the 
Stufenleiter passage does not require representations of particulars, nor 
does it guarantee successful reference. Second, by satisfying the thought-
condition cognition in the narrow sense discriminates and classifies objects 
by virtue of their features. Thus, if I cognize an object as a table, I can 
discriminate it from those objects in its environment that display different 
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features (the floor and the ceiling) and classify it as having features that it 
shares with some other objects (other tables). Again, cognition in the broad 
sense may not involve discrimination or classification, since intuitions, taken 
in isolation, can be “blind” in that regard. And third, cognition in the narrow 
sense represents existing objects and their features in such a way as to 
afford an immediate awareness of them. In other words, cognition makes the
existence and features of objects available to one’s mind and thus can serve 
as the basis for attitudes such as belief or knowledge (more on which below).
As a result, cognition in the narrow sense has specific semantic and 
epistemic features that are richer than those had by cognition in the broader 
sense. Kant’s emphasis on objects being given in intuition and thought 
through concepts gives expression to these substantive features. That is, 
Kant’s focus on cognition derives from the importance of representing 
objects that exist and to do so in ways that allow us to discriminate between 
them, since without the ability to represent objects in this way, there would 
be little point, and even less hope of success in attempting to represent 
objects at all or to gain knowledge about them.
Cognition in the narrow sense also relates to judgment (albeit in 
complex ways we can mention only briefly). At times, Kant seems to 
conceive of judgment very generally such that it is a conscious 
representation that unifies a plurality of representations under a concept (cf. 
9:101, A68/B93). Cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of a judgment
in this sense. For example, the mental state which I am in when I seem to 
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see a red ball in front of me is already a judgment insofar as it unites two 
representations (ball, red) in one act of consciousness by “comprehending” 
the one under the other. At other times, however, Kant has a somewhat 
narrower conception of judgment (e.g., in judgments of experience) that is 
objective in the sense of representing a state of affairs as holding 
independently from the judging subject (B141f.; 4:298). At least some 
cognitions in the narrow sense would qualify as judgments in this sense. For 
example, the empirical cognition that this ball is red would be a judgment in 
this sense. It is important to recognize that judgment in both of these senses,
and cognition along with it, does not necessarily involve assent, or taking the
proposition in question to be true.26 In this respect, Kant differs from Frege, 
for whom judgment itself is an assent to a proposition (“Gedanke”).27
Another aspect worth mentioning is that cognition in the narrow sense,
as such, does not require epistemic justification. This is not to deny that 
cognition may, in some indirect way, require philosophical justification. For 
instance, for a representation to qualify as cognition, it must satisfy the 
thought condition, which requires establishing the objective reality of the 
concept(s) employed in that representation. In case these concepts are 
“pure” (a priori) concepts (such as the categories or ideas of reason), they 
require a “transcendental deduction”, that is, proof of their objective reality 
(or, equivalently, of the real possibility of their object). This is what we take 
to be Kant’s point when he says that “[t]o cognize an object, it is required 
that I be able to prove its possibility” (Bxxvi fn.).28 In this way, cognition does 
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involve a normative dimension (“quid juris”). But such a proof is obviously 
different from the epistemic justification of a particular belief that is required 
for knowledge – a justification that does not consist in showing a concept to 
have objective reality (or an object to be ‘really possible’), but in showing a 
belief to be true. 
Against this, it might be objected that Kant’s focus on the possibility of 
synthetic cognition a priori (cf. B19) shows that cognition does require 
epistemic justification after all, since Kant is obviously interested not only in 
whether a priori concepts such as cause or soul have objective reality, but 
also in whether we can prove certain synthetic judgments a priori such as 
‘Every event has a cause’ or ‘The souls of human beings are immortal’ (with 
Kant giving a positive answer in the first and a negative one in the second 
case). But note, first, that it is not at all obvious that the “possibility” of 
synthetic cognition a priori Kant is interested in is the same as their being 
epistemically justified (even though Kant might be interested in that as well).
And, second, our claim that cognition as such does not require epistemic 
justification does not rule out that there are specific kinds of cognition (such 
as the ‘principles of pure understanding’) that do require epistemic 
justification (even though it may be more adequate to say that what requires
epistemic justification is our belief in them, not the cognitions themselves). 
Having clarified the broader and narrower conceptions of cognition in 
these ways, we can now see that it is the narrower conception that plays an 
especially central role in Kant’s project in the first Critique. Kant states that 
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one of his primary motivations in this work is to determine whether 
metaphysics is possible (Axi; Bxivff.). Since, on his analysis, metaphysics 
would consist of synthetic a priori cognition about various unconditioned 
objects, such as God, the immortality of the soul, and the world as a totality 
(including transcendental freedom), he must determine “the possibility, the 
principles, and the domain of all cognitions a priori” (B6) so as to be able to 
establish whether metaphysics is possible. Throughout the argument of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic, he then shows 
how distinct contributions from both sensibility and the understanding are 
required to explain synthetic a priori cognition in general. Accordingly, the 
Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding is 
designed to show that the categories cannot be employed on their own, but 
rather must be applied to objects given in space and time for them to have 
objective reality and thus for cognition to be possible. Specifically, since the 
categories are concepts through which objects are thought and since space 
and time are forms of intuitions through which objects are given, his 
argument reveals how the thought- and givenness-conditions are satisfied 
and thus how cognition in the narrower sense is possible. By contrast, no 
argument would be needed to show that the categories satisfy the conditions
on cognition in the broad sense of the Stufenleiter passage, since they are 
conscious representations with objective representational content, even 
before they have been shown to have objective reality. Thus, what is at stake
in the Transcendental Deduction is whether the categories can contribute to 
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cognition in the narrow sense. Similarly, what is at stake in Kant’s critique of 
traditional metaphysics is whether or not its claims can live up to the 
standards of cognition in the narrow sense.  
II. Kant’s Conception of Knowledge
It is striking that throughout much (but not all) of the first Critique, 
Kant does not invoke knowledge and its cognates in an especially technical 
or systematic way. Though he does famously ask “What can I know?” (A805/
B833), as a question that concerns the goal of theoretical inquiry as a whole, 
and also famously claims that he intends “to deny [aufheben] knowledge to 
make room for faith” (Bxxx), he does not discuss knowledge and its 
conditions in the course of his argument in the first Critique in the same 
detailed way that he does for cognition. Instead, when he talks about 
knowledge, it is mostly at the meta-level, focusing on whether we can know 
that we can have cognition (A43/B60) or consciousness (B409).29 This is not 
to say that one cannot find an occasional passage where Kant does talk 
about, say, knowledge of things in themselves, but rather only that he does 
not take himself to be providing a comprehensive analysis of the conditions 
of knowledge in particular.30
At the same time, Kant does eventually provide the outlines of an 
account of knowledge in the first Critique, namely in the Canon of Pure 
Reason in the Doctrine of Method. There, Kant discusses knowledge as one 
of the basic modes of “taking to be true” (Fürwahrhalten), or assent 
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(A822/B850; cf. 9: 66). What distinguishes assent from other mental acts is 
that it involves both an attitude toward a judgment and an assessment of the
grounds, or reasons, that would support that attitude. Thus, one takes 
something to be true in different ways, or assents to it in a particular mode, 
on the basis of the reasons that one takes to justify what one is assenting to 
(where the kind of assent that is appropriate depends on the kind of reasons 
at hand along with an assessment of their adequacy). 
In his discussion in the Canon, Kant begins by distinguishing between 
conviction and persuasion. If an assent “is valid for everyone merely as long 
as he has reason, then its ground is objectively sufficient” (A820/B848) and it
amounts to conviction. By contrast, if an assent “has its ground only in the 
particular constitution of the subject”, then it is persuasion. With this 
distinction in hand, Kant then turns to distinguishing between three different 
kinds, or “stages” (Stufen), of assent as follows:
Taking something to be true, or the subjective validity of judgment, 
has the following three stages in relation to conviction (which at the 
same time is valid objectively): having an opinion, believing, and 
knowing. Having an opinion is taking something to be true with the 
consciousness that it is subjectively as well as objectively insufficient.
If taking something to be true is only subjectively sufficient and is at 
the same time held to be objectively insufficient, then it is called 
believing. Finally, when taking something to be true is both 
subjectively and objectively sufficient it is called knowing. Subjective 
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sufficiency is called conviction (for myself), objective sufficiency, 
certainty (for everyone). I will not pause for the exposition of such 
readily grasped concepts. (A822/B850)
It is unfortunate that Kant takes the concepts that he uses to distinguish 
opinion, belief, and knowledge to be so easily grasped, since his failure to 
spell them out clearly leads to a non-trivial degree of indeterminacy about 
the basic structure of his account.31 Still, we can, perhaps, make out the 
following elements of his account of knowledge with some degree of 
confidence.
Kant relies on two notions to distinguish knowledge, belief, and 
opinion: subjective and objective sufficiency. What distinguishes knowledge 
and belief is that knowledge involves both subjective and objective 
sufficiency, whereas belief requires subjective sufficiency and objective 
insufficiency. In the Jäsche Logik, Kant articulates what seems to be 
substantially the same distinction by speaking of “reasons” or “reasons of 
cognition” (Erkenntnisgründen) for assent that are either subjectively 
sufficient, objectively sufficient, or both (9:66ff.). Although there is room for 
disagreement here, we take it that a reason is subjectively sufficient if, in a 
given subject, it brings about a firm conviction in the subject in question.32 A 
reason is objectively sufficient if it brings about certainty, i.e. “consciousness
of necessity”, whereas a reason is objectively insufficient if it involves the 
consciousness of “the possibility of the contrary” (9:66). In other words, an 
objectively sufficient ground guarantees the truth of the judgment for which 
19
it is a ground. Thus, while subjective sufficiency concerns the firmness of 
assent, objective sufficiency concerns the degree of epistemic justification.33 
Further, Kant seems to be committed to a version of epistemic 
internalism about knowledge insofar as knowledge requires consciousness of
the objective ground, that is, access both to the grounds of knowledge and 
to their adequacy as grounds. If “consciousness of necessity” is understood 
as consciousness that given one’s grounds, the judgment to which one is 
assenting cannot be false, then Kant’s notion of knowledge, by requiring 
objectively sufficient grounds, also requires infallibility and thus truth.34 
However, this does not prevent Kant from accepting empirical (cf. 9:66) and 
even “historical” knowledge (e.g. knowledge from testimony) (cf. 8:141), 
both of which can be “certain” (cf. 9:71). Empirical and historical knowledge 
can be infallible if, e.g., knowledge is understood along broadly ‘disjunctivist’
lines.35 If your reason to believe that there is a red ball in front of you, is that 
you can see the red ball, then this guarantees the truth of your belief, which 
thus amounts to knowledge. Now it may happen that you take yourself to 
have such a reason when in fact you do not, but this does not undermine the
idea that if you do have such a reason, you cannot be mistaken and thus 
have knowledge.36 In this way, Kant’s infallibilism about knowledge is 
compatible with a general acknowledgment of the fallibility of our cognitive 
faculties. 
For Kant knowledge (Wissen) also has a more than merely 
etymological connection with science (Wissenschaft) (cf. 9:72). In fact, Kant 
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places very stringent requirements on science; it must be systematically 
ordered according to rational principles and be known a priori with apodictic 
certainty (4:468). It is in virtue of these requirements that we can attain the 
kind of insight and comprehension that Kant seems to have in mind with the 
sixth and seventh degrees of cognition in the passage from the Jäsche Logik. 
Further, given how little Kant says in a clear and explicit manner about 
objectively sufficient grounds, it is quite possible that the grounds, or 
justification, required for knowledge could include the additional systematic 
and a priori requirements demanded for it to qualify as science, properly so-
called. 
To summarize, Kant’s account of knowledge contains the following 
elements. Most fundamentally, knowledge is a kind of assent, or taking to be 
true, and that assent must be based on an objective ground, since 
knowledge is a mental act that requires justification. In addition, the kind of 
justification the assent is based on must be such that it guarantees truth. 
Kant goes further by endorsing a substantive notion of justification that 
requires both apodictic certainty and an internalist element, and it may even
include the kinds of coherence and systematicity that bestow the special 
status of science on a body of knowledge.
In light of this description of Kant’s account of knowledge, we can see 
that it is either a special case of, or a close cousin to, the contemporary 
tripartite conception, according to which knowledge is warranted true 
belief.37 For Kant’s account satisfies each of the three elements of this 
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definition, or at least comes very close to doing so. As we have just 
emphasized, Kant requires that (1) knowledge be warranted, (2) the degree 
of certainty provided by the kind of warrant that he requires entails truth, 
and (3) assent might not be too dissimilar from what is meant by “belief” in 
contemporary contexts.38 At the same time, insofar as Kant’s notion of 
justification entails certainty, his conception is much more demanding than 
most currently discussed variants of the tripartite conception of knowledge.
III. Comparison and Contrast
In light of these descriptions of Kant’s conceptions of cognition and 
knowledge, we are now in a position to show that because of extensive and 
fundamental differences the two cannot be identified.39
The first and most fundamental difference between cognition and 
knowledge, as Kant understands it, concerns the kind of mental states they 
are. While cognition is a certain kind of conscious representation, knowledge,
as a species of assent, is what we think of today as a propositional attitude. 
Second, cognition, as such, does not require epistemic justification. It 
is enough for cognition if I am aware of some general feature of an object 
that I am encountering through my senses.40 Knowledge, by contrast, 
requires a (very specific kind of) epistemic justification, namely an 
objectively sufficient reason. If Kant goes so far as to hold that any objective 
justification requires the kind of systematicity and coherence that is 
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characteristic of scientific knowledge, the distance between cognition in the 
narrow sense and knowledge would be even greater. 
Third, while knowledge requires truth, it is at least not obvious that 
cognition, even in the narrow sense, must always be true. 
Fourth, while cognition explicitly requires that the existence of an 
object be given to us in intuition, there is no such restriction on knowledge. 
Though knowledge requires an objectively sufficient ground, this does not 
immediately entail that an object must be given in intuition.41 
Finally, while cognition always involves the determination of a given 
object (i.e. attributing some general feature to it), knowledge as such does 
not, as the case of “analytic” knowledge shows.42 Thus, it seems in principle 
possible for Kant to allow for knowledge of objects of which we cannot have 
cognition. 
In sum, while cognition is a conscious representation that is 
characterized by its representational content (conceptual determination of 
an object), semantic features (successful reference to an existing object) and
object-involving character (awareness of the existence and features of 
objects), knowledge is a propositional attitude that is defined in terms of a 
particular kind of epistemic justification. Therefore, cognition, for Kant, is 
clearly distinct from knowledge as he understands it.43 
But cognition is also distinct from our contemporary notion of 
knowledge, which, as we have seen, is less specific than Kant’s. 
Unsurprisingly, many of the reasons that tell against identifying cognition 
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with knowledge as Kant understands it, also speak against identifying it with 
our contemporary notion of knowledge. Insofar as cognition is an objective 
representation that has a specific kind of semantic content, it need not 
involve any kind of epistemic justification. Insofar as one can speak of 
cognitions being false, it does not entail truth. And because cognition as such
does not involve assent, it is different in kind from belief. In short, cognition 
requires neither justification, nor belief, and perhaps not even truth, and is 
thus fundamentally distinct from knowledge as we understand it today.
If cognition and knowledge are thus distinct, several questions 
immediately arise. For one, if cognition is different in character from 
knowledge, is cognition still philosophically significant and if so, how? For 
another, could cognition be relevant for knowledge even though it is distinct 
from it? As for the first question, it is, we hope, clear that Kant’s concern with
cognition reveals an interest in a wide range of fundamental philosophical 
issues involving reference (both singular and general), representational 
content (both non-conceptual and conceptual), and the nature of (objective) 
representation and judgment. For Kant is concerned with nothing less than 
how it is possible for us to represent and be directly aware of particular 
objects and their determinate features.44 Thus, even where Kant’s focus in 
the first Critique is not on either epistemic justification or epistemology in the
narrow sense (of warranted true belief), he is clearly interested in a broad 
array of issues concerning objective representation that remain at the center
of philosophical debate today.
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To the best of our knowledge, Kant does not address the second 
question explicitly. However, given the accounts we have provided above, 
we believe that cognition in the narrow sense can contribute to knowledge in
at least two central ways. First, if knowledge is a kind of assent and what we 
assent to is a judgment, then whenever the judgment we assent to qualifies 
as a cognition, knowledge is an assent to a cognition. Second, cognition can 
contribute to the kind of objective justification that is required for knowledge.
As we saw above, Kant did not specify what would count as an objective 
justification and how it would guarantee truth. But since human beings have 
cognitive access to the existence and determinate features of an object only 
through cognition, all justification of empirical knowledge must, it seems, 
involve cognition of empirical objects. For instance, knowledge that there is a
red ball in front of me will be based on my being aware of the ball before me 
and its being red, i.e. on my cognition of it. Moreover, the kind of awareness 
that is involved in cognition fits with the requirement that we be aware both 
of the grounds involved in the justification of knowledge and of the adequacy
of these grounds. For if the cognition is (at least) part of the relevant grounds
and cognition involves awareness of the object, then we can be aware both 
of the grounds and of how they could support the judgment to which one is 
assenting (though more is required for this complex awareness than the 
mere presence of a cognition). As a result, it is possible to see how cognition 
can contribute to the justification required for knowledge without itself being 
an instance of knowledge.
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IV. Consequences for Understanding the Critique of Pure Reason
If cognition is distinct from knowledge, what implications does this 
have for our understanding of Kant’s central tenet in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, his two-fold claim that human cognition, including synthetic 
cognition a priori, is possible with respect to empirical objects, but not for 
things in themselves? 
Most importantly, distinguishing clearly between cognition and 
knowledge allows us to see that Kant’s claim, and indeed his main focus in 
the Critique, is not primarily epistemic, but semantic, since it concerns the 
conditions of the semantic features of our representations rather than in 
what is specifically required for knowledge. That is, Kant’s concern with 
synthetic a priori cognition and with the possibility of cognition of things in 
themselves is first and foremost a concern with the semantic presuppositions
of representations that would provide us with a conscious awareness of the 
existence of objects and (at least some of) their determinate features. The 
main line of Kant’s argument is that (1) synthetic a priori cognitions are 
possible (in theoretical philosophy) only if we have a priori intuitions, since 
they make it possible for us to connect a priori representations that are not 
connected by means of purely logical relations, and (2) it is because we do 
not come into immediate contact with things in themselves that we cannot 
form representations of them that would have the kind of semantic content 
required for cognition in the sense that is of interest to Kant. In short, Kant is 
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interested, not primarily in knowledge, but in specific kinds of semantic 
features of our representations—awareness of the existence and general 
features of individual objects—and wants to show (against rationalists like 
Leibniz) that our representations of (at least certain) things in themselves 
lack these features.
But isn’t it one of Kant’s goals in the first Critique to show that the 
principles of the understanding (such as the principle of causality) provide 
us, not just with cognition, but with a priori knowledge about empirical 
objects? Note that this is not something Kant ever explicitly says. To 
maintain that his concern in the first Critique is primarily epistemological, 
would thus require showing that his various arguments about the possibility 
of cognition are in fact about the kind of ‘objective grounds’ Kant requires for
knowledge, rather than about the semantic considerations specific to 
cognition. 
This is not to say, however, that Kant is not at all concerned with 
knowledge in the first Critique. As noted above, he famously says that he 
had “to deny knowledge [of immortality, freedom, and God] in order to make
room for faith” (Bxxx). That is, Kant denies that we can have any substantive
knowledge of specific things in themselves. And the justification for this 
claim is now clear: such knowledge claims would be lacking in their objective
justification on just those points that prevent us from having cognition of 
things in themselves. At the same time, because knowledge is different from 
cognition, he can allow that we have some knowledge of things in 
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themselves. For example, he can allow that we know that things in 
themselves are not spatio-temporal and that they exist (as a necessary 
presupposition of the appearances that we encounter in experience), two 
claims to which Kant is clearly committed. Perhaps he would even be willing 
to grant that analytic truths apply to things in themselves as well.45 
But note two crucial features of such claims to knowledge of things in 
themselves. First, the justifications of such claims would have to be 
independent of any particular cognition we might have. Even if Kant’s 
reasons for asserting these claims are a matter of considerable dispute, it is 
clear that they would have to be supported by some kind of philosophical 
argument (e.g., a transcendental argument) rather than specific cognitions. 
Second, these claims are generic in character. That is, they do not pertain to 
some things in themselves and not to others, but rather apply to all or none 
alike.46 This is one of the features that distinguishes such knowledge of 
things in themselves from cognition in the narrow sense, since cognition, in 
the fundamental case of singular cognition, requires a (direct or indirect) 
relation to (the existence of) an individual object with features that 
distinguish it from other objects.
As a result, the distinction between cognition and knowledge as well as
the distinction between generic knowledge of things in themselves and 
knowledge that would distinguish between specific things in themselves, are 
crucial to understanding Kant’s central claims in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
For even if it is possible to have some generic philosophical knowledge of 
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things in themselves, such knowledge does not prevent Kant from arguing 
that we cannot have cognition of things in themselves, since our 
representations of them lack the appropriate semantic features. Nor does it 
keep him from claiming that we cannot have knowledge of those specific 
things in themselves that are the objects of traditional metaphysics, such as 
God, freedom, and the soul, since we do not possess the kind of cognitions 
that would be needed to support the objective justifications that such 
specific knowledge claims would require. In short, drawing these kinds of 
distinctions enables, we hope, an approach to the Critique of Pure Reason 
that is both more faithful to the text and of considerable philosophical 
interest in its own right.47 
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1 In Kemp Smith’s defense, “Erkenntnis” is Kant’s translation of “cognitio”, 
which, in medieval philosophical texts, is commonly translated as “knowledge”.
2 Allison 2004 and Guyer 1987. 
3 Henrich 1973.
4 Cf. Guyer’s and Wood’s translation of the Critique of Pure Reason in the 
Cambridge Edition of Kant’s writings, who mostly translate ‘Erkenntnis’ as 
‘cognition’ (but cf. e.g. B25 and A237/B297 B25, where it is translated as 
‘knoweldge’). 
5 For a clear and representative statement of this reading, cf. Grüne 2009, 27f.
6 In the following, we restrict ourselves to theoretical cognition. Kant does 
introduce (and extensively use) the term practical cognition, but his views on 
the practical case are complex and would require separate treatment. (See 
Kain, 2010 for helpful discussion of practical cognition.) Further, though Kant 
distinguishes several different types of theoretical cognition—a priori, 
historical, mathematical, self-cognition—we confine ourselves to the more 
generic notion of cognition in general.
7 If analytic judgments qualify as knowledge, they require neither the existence
of an object nor the attribution of features to it.
8 We have benefitted from papers by Tolley (unpublished manuscript, January 
28, 2013), Schafer (unpublished manuscript, Nov. 13, 2013), and Chignell 
(2014), all of whom distinguish between cognition and knowledge, albeit in 
ways that differ from ours in their details.
9 Note that although “Erkenntnis” is a common German word, especially when 
used as a verb in “erkennen”, it is a technical term in eighteenth-century 
philosophy insofar as it was used as the German equivalent of “cognitio”, which
had been a commonly used term in philosophy since the middle ages and 
throughout early modern philosophy. Although Kant wrote all his major works 
in German, most of his terminology is deeply rooted in the Leibniz-Wolffian 
tradition. On the use of “cognitio” in early modern philosophy and Kant’s 
immediate predecessors, cf. Carriero (2013), and Tolley (unpublished 
manuscript). 
10 The Jäsche Logik has a somewhat uncertain status in Kant’s corpus, because 
Jäsche was heavily involved in the production of the book in such a way that 
one cannot be sure that it truly reflects Kant’s position in every respect. 
However, a very similar list of six degrees of cognition can be found both in 
Kant’s handwritten Reflexion 2394 (16:343) as well as in the lecture transcript 
Logik Pölitz (24:539). Interestingly, while the third degree from the Jäsche 
Logik (“kennen (noscere)”) is missing in the lecture transcript, the fourth 
degree (“erkennen (cognoscere)”) is missing in the Reflexion (also cf. Logik 
Dohna-Wundlacken; 24:730). So the seven degrees in the Jäsche-Logik may be 
the result of Jäsche’s combining the two six-step lists. In any case, the 
distinction between the degrees of cognition and their ordering seem to be 
Kant’s own.
11 Cf. 9:91, where Kant seems to use “cognition” in the Stufenleiter sense by 
saying that “all cognition, that is, all representations related with 
consciousness to an object, are either intuitions or concepts” (also cf. 24:752). 
In the Jäsche Logik, Kant defines the relevant sense of “consciousness” as “a 
representation that some other representation is in me” (9:33).
12 Other readings of the Stufenleiter passage are possible. Thus, although Kant 
is most naturally read in this way, he does not explicitly claim that all intuitions
and all concepts are cognitions (but rather only that all cognitions are either 
intuitions or concepts). This would allow for concepts that are not cognitions, 
and ideas might be examples thereof. 
13 Some of these differences seem to derive from a difference in emphasis: 
Where the classification in the Logik focuses more on acts of cognition (“to 
perceive something”, “to understand something” etc.), the Stufenleiter is 
interested in kinds of representations (“perception”, “notion” etc.)
14 See also B146.
15 These conditions are described more fully in Watkins and Willaschek (2017).
16 It may seem that existence cannot be required for givenness, since 
givenness is necessary for cognition and some of Kant’s formulations seems to 
suggest that what is required for cognition is not the existence, but only the 
real possibility of the cognized object (cf. e.g. Bxxivf. Fn). However, on our 
reading real possibility is required not for the givenness-, but for the thought-
condition on cognition to be satisfied. Cf. below. For a more detailed argument 
for requiring that the givenness condition be understood as involving existence
(for both empirical and mathematical objects), see Watkins and Willaschek 
(2017a and 2017b). Note also, however, that the main point of this paper 
obtains regardless of whether one accepts our specific interpretation of the 
givenness condition.
17 Cf. the following passage, where Kant uses “given” first in the passive sense 
relevant for human beings and then in the active sense pertaining to the divine
mind: “a divine understanding, which would not represent given objects, but 
through whose representation the objects would themselves at the same time 
be given, or produced” (B145; emphasis added).
18 Kant indicates that cognition involves more than a concept when he notes 
that if “an intuition corresponding to the concept could not be given at all, then
it would be a thought as far as its form is concerned, but without any object, 
and by its means no cognition of anything at all would be possible, since, as far
as I would know, nothing would be given nor could be given to which my 
thought could be applied” (B146). That is, it is not simply that we would in fact 
lack an object, but also that, as far as we could tell, no such object could be 
given. Kant’s interest in “relation to an object” arises in the context of 
concepts, and thus the thought condition, rather than in that of intuitions, and 
the givenness condition.
19 This point is sometimes connected with the claim that objects must be shown
to be really possible (Bxxvi), where real possibility is contrasted with logical 
possibility. Because Kant’s notion of real possibility is complex and does not 
match up neatly with that of, say, metaphysical possibility, we do not consider 
how it bears on the thought-condition. Kant’s discussion at, e.g., A96 is 
relevant, where he explicitly notes that one can think (but not cognize) “objects
that are perhaps impossible, or that are perhaps possible in themselves but 
cannot be given in any experience”. Note also that on this understanding of 
real possibility if an object is given in intuition and thus exists, one still needs 
to establish that the object is really possible, for real possibility, as we 
understand it, is tied to a concept insofar as one must be able to show that the 
object could also be given in such a way that our concept can apply to it.
20 For example, Kant sometimes says that the categories must be shown to 
have “Sinn” und “Bedeutung”, or sense and significance (or meaning). Though 
Kant sometimes seems to identify these terms and to take them both to 
indicate reference, there are other passages (A241/B300) that suggest a 
subtler set of distinctions. According to these passages, it is one thing for a 
concept to refer to an object, another to demonstrate that it can refer, and yet 
another to have a sense of what an object is like or how the object would (have
to) appear to us for the concept to apply to it (B149).
21 Kant adds a further specification to the thought-condition, namely that 
thought must contain positive content to contribute to cognition: “[i]t is not yet
a genuine cognition if I merely indicate what the intuition of the object is not, 
without being able to say what is then contained in it; for then I have not 
represented the possibility of an object for my pure concept of the 
understanding at all” (B149).
22 This shows that the relation between a representation and its object that is 
constitutive of a cognition is not one of adequate representation or 
“agreement” (A58/B83). 
23 Kant denies only that a cognition could be “wholly false” (24:93), presumably
because this would make it impossible for the representation to stand in a 
suitable relation to its object.
24 Cf. Kant’s discussions of the relation between truth and cognition at B115 
and A293/B350, neither of which decides the issue. The mere fact that 
“erkennen” in German is a success verb and thus appears to imply truth does 
not help either since Kant does allow for false cognition. 
25 However, only singular cognitions directly represent individual objects as 
such; general cognitions, which satisfy the givenness-condition only in a more 
relaxed sense, do so only indirectly, by having singular cognitions as their 
instances.
26 Kant sometimes speaks of assent (“Fürwahrhalten”) as a kind of judging (e.g.
9:66), which makes sense insofar as assent is directed at a judgment. But the 
converse does not hold, since Kant explains judgment as a kind of complex 
conscious representation and never mentions assent. It is one thing 
consciously to represent some objective state of affairs (such as a ball’s being 
red), it is another to take it to be true that this state of affairs obtains (that the 
ball is red). This does not mean, however, that cognition consists in the mere 
entertaining of a thought. Rather, in the basic case, it is the awareness of the 
existence of an objects and some of its features.
27 “Judgment” (like Urteil) is ambiguous between the act of judging and the 
content judged. We do not want to deny that Kant sometimes uses “judgment” 
in the former sense, which may be assimilated to that of “assent(ing”). Where 
Kant identifies judgment and cognition, however, he typically uses judgment in 
the latter sense (for a kind of representation). 
28 We take this to be a claim not about cognition in general, but, as the context 
makes clear, about philosophical cognition in particular. 
29 Where the English translation has Kant speaking of an “unknown object” 
(A479/B507), “unknown” is actually a translation of “unbekannt”, which is a 
cognate not of “knowledge” (Wissen), but rather of “cognition” (Erkenntnis).
30 Matters are different when it comes to the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science, which focuses on the question of scientific knowledge.
31 Moreover, while Kant expands on his accounts of opinion and belief in the 
course of the Canon, knowledge does not receive separate treatment, but is 
mentioned only in passing after the quoted passage. In fact, Kant’s main focus 
in Section Three of the Canon is on belief (as the attitude appropriate towards 
God’s existence and the immortality of the soul). Thus, the only paragraph in 
the whole Critique that explicitly addresses the concept of knowledge does so 
in order to clarify, not the concept of knowledge, but that of belief. This 
underlines our previous observation that knowledge is not Kant’s central 
concern in the first Critique. 
32 For a similar reading, cf. Pasternack 2011, 202.
33 For a different reading, cf. Chignell (2007, 33), who claims (against Kant’s 
insistence that knowledge requires certainty) that objectively sufficient 
grounds are fallible (42). This claim may rest on confusing fallibility in the 
sense that we can mistakenly take ourselves to know something (and thus to 
have objectively sufficient grounds) with the (for Kant incoherent) assumption 
that knowledge itself (and the grounds it is based on) could be fallible (also cf. 
next paragraph).   
34 That certainty implies truth is supported by the fact that Meier, on whose 
textbook Kant based his logic lectures, defines certainty as “consciousness of 
the truth of a cognition” (1752, § 29). Kant accepts this definition “for the time 
being” in Logic Blomberg (24:57). Also cf. Logic Blomberg “the certainty of a 
cognition, on the other hand, rests on its objective truth” (24:143). 
35 Cf. McDowell (2011). Our fallibility, according to McDowell, resides in our 
cognitive capacities (which can be misapplied), not in the individual case 
(which is either true or false and, if true and based on the right kind of reason, 
knowledge).
36 Cf. Engstrom (2009, 108 ff.), for a similar account of error in Kant.
37 Despite Gettier, most current epistemologists seem to accept some kind of 
tripartite definition of knowledge (true belief plus X). 
38 For discussion of significant differences between these two notions, see 
Chignell (2007, 37).
39 In what follows, unless otherwise indicated, ‘cognition’ means ‘cognition in 
the narrow sense’. That cognition in the wider sense differs from knowledge 
should be obvious.
40 Since cognition requires the involvement of concepts whose objective reality 
must be established (e.g., in the Transcendental Deduction for the categories), 
cognition may require some kind of (“philosophical”) justification, but it does 
not require the kind of (“epistemic”) justification that is at issue with 
knowledge.
41 If Kant’s account of what an objectively sufficient ground could be specified 
further, this claim might need to be revised accordingly. It is, to our mind, 
striking that Kant does not explicitly relate his account of objectively sufficient 
grounds to his account of cognition.
42 According to Kant, analytic judgments do not contain “determinations” 
(9:111), that is, do not “determine” their objects (also cf. 20:268: “Determining
means judging synthetically”). Kant does at times speak of “analytic 
cognition”, but we are inclined to read those passages as referring to cognition 
in the broader sense.
43 It is true that the special kind of objective justification that Kant requires for 
knowledge involves apodictic certainty, i.e., consciousness of necessity, which 
might seem to bring cognition closer to knowledge after all. However, the kind 
of consciousness involved in apodictic certainty is different from the kind of 
consciousness that one has in cognition. For in the case of cognition, we must 
be conscious of the object, including its existence and features, whereas in the 
case of knowledge, we must be conscious of the (objective) grounds that justify
our assent to a judgment, and of their adequacy as objective grounds. In short, 
though consciousness must be present in both cases, what one must be aware 
of in each case is quite different. 
44 Indeed, even a cursory acquaintance with current literature devoted to 
contemporary philosophical topics reveals that the issues Kant is concerned 
with are still very much lively topics of debate, as is on display in, for example, 
Burge (2010 and 2013). How experience can afford us a direct awareness of 
objects and their features is a central theme in McDowell (1994 and 2009). 
45 Although Kant does occasionally use some variant of the phrase ‘analytic 
cognition’ (cf. A8/B12), he does not, as far as we are aware, ever use the 
phrase analytic knowledge, so this point is a somewhat speculative suggestion.
Still, one might think that it is hard to see how, given their nature, analytic 
propositions could be false, though one might well have concerns about 
whether they have the kind of semantic content that is necessary for them to 
refer to objects of a given domain and thus qualify as cognition.
46 This is not to exclude that the empirical world might be grounded in some but
not all of the things in themselves. It excludes only that we could know which 
they are. In this sense, our knowledge of the intelligible ground of experience 
(the “transcendental object”; cf. A109) is purely general.
47 Both authors contributed equally to this paper. For helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this paper we thank audiences at the Deutsche Kongress für 
Philosophie 2014 in Münster, Germany, a conference on Kant and Knowledge 
and Cognition at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and at a meeting of the 
History of Philosophy of Roundtable at University of California, San Diego as 
well as referees for Synthese.
